Abstract. The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of nature. In this chapter, we motivate and review two results that generalize de Finetti's theorem to the quantum mechanical setting: Namely a de Finetti theorem for quantum states and a de Finetti theorem for quantum operations. The quantum-state theorem, in a closely analogous fashion to the original de Finetti theorem, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational definition of the concept of an "unknown quantum state" in quantum-state tomography. Similarly, the quantum-operation theorem gives an operational definition of an "unknown quantum operation" in quantum-process tomography. These results are especially important for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics, where quantum states and (at least some) quantum operations are taken to be states of belief rather than states of nature.
Introduction
What is a quantum state?
3 Since the earliest days of quantum theory, it has been understood that the quantum state can be used (through the Born rule) to derive probability distributions for the outcomes of all measurements that can be performed on a quantum system. But is it more than that? Is a quantum state an actual property of the system it describes? The Bayesian view of quantum states [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] is that it is not: The quantum state is not something the system itself possesses. Rather it is solely a function of the observer (or, better, agent) who contemplates the predictions, gambles, decisions, or actions he might make with regard to those quantum measurements.
3 This chapter represents predominantly a culling of the material in [1] [2] [3] . Everything, however, has been updated to accommodate the major shift in our thinking represented in [4] [5] [6] . In particular, it reflects a change in our views of quantum probabilities from that of an objective Bayesianism of the type promoted by E. T. Jaynes [7] to a subjective or personalistic Bayesianism of the type promoted by B. de Finetti, L. J. Savage, J. M. Bernardo and A. F. M. Smith, and R. Jeffrey [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . This makes all the difference in the world with regard to the meaning of quantum states, operations, and their usage within statistical theory. What distinguishes this view from a more traditional "Copenhageninterpretation style" view-for instance the view expressed so clearly and carefully in [23] -is that there is no pretense that a quantum state represents a physical fact. Quantum states come logically before that: They represent the temporary and provisional beliefs a physicist holds as he travels down the road of inquiry. It is the outcomes of quantum measurements that represent physical facts within quantum theory, not the quantum states. In particular, there is no fact of nature to prohibit two different agents from using distinct pure states |ψ and |φ for a single quantum system.
4 Difficult though this may be to accept for someone trained in the traditional presentation of quantum mechanics, the only thing it demonstrates is a careful distinction between the terms belief and fact.
Quantum states are not facts. 5 But if so, then what is an "unknown quantum state"? There is hardly a paper in the field of quantum information that does not make use of the phrase. Unknown quantum states are teleported [28, 29] , protected with quantum error correcting codes [30, 31] , and used to check for quantum eavesdropping [32, 33] . The list of uses grows each day. Are all these papers nonsense? In a Bayesian view of quantum states, the phrase is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms: If quantum states are states of belief rather than states of nature, then a state is known by someone-at the very least, by the agent who holds it. See Fig. 5.1 .
Thus for a quantum Bayesian, if a phenomenon ostensibly invokes the concept of an unknown state in its formulation, the unknown state must be a kind of shorthand for a more involved story. In other words, the usage should be viewed a call to arms, an opportunity for further analysis. For any phenomenon using the idea of an unknown quantum state, the quantum Bayesian should demand that either:
1. The owner of the unknown state-some further agent-be explicitly identified. (In this case, the unknown state is merely a stand-in for the unknown state of belief of an essential player who went unrecognized in the original formulation.) Or, 2. If there is clearly no further agent upon the scene, then a way must be found to reexpress the phenomenon with the term "unknown state" banished from the formulation. (In this case, the end-product will be a single quantum state used for describing the phenomenon-namely, the state that actually captures the initial agent's overall beliefs throughout.)
